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ABSTRACT
This essay asserts that comparative legal scholarship might overcome its 
current crisis of relevance by reorienting itself towards decolonizing critique. 
In a recent article, decrying the current state of the discipline, Pierre Legrand 
argued that comparative law has become mired in a solipsistic and outmoded 
style of positivism. Draying upon insights from critical theory, he argues that the 
discipline might render itself more relevant by engaging in a more contextualized 
analyses of the law and by encouraging active interpretation beyond descriptive 
reporting. This essay extends Legrand’s argument to suggest that an emancipated, 
incorporative, and interdisciplinary comparative law might play an important 
role in decolonizing legal scholarship more broadly. Founded in a commitment 
to constrain an ethnocentric impulse in legal discourse, comparative law seems a 
natural site from which to challenge the varieties of Eurocentrism that continue 
to define legal scholarship and study and for exploring the colonial roots of 
globalized racial formations.
Keywords: Comparative Law; Decolonizing Critique; Pierre Legrand; Critical 
Theory.
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DE TEORIA E PRÁTICA
 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
DECOLONIZING CRITIQUE1
1  I am grateful to the American Journal of Comparative Law, in which a version of this article 
was first published. I am also grateful to Mathilde Cohen, Mariel Emanuel, Claudia Hasburn, 
Betsy Kuhn, Kim Lane Scheppele, Andrew Lang, Allegra McLeod, Philomila Tsoukala, and Franz 
Werro for providing helpful feedback. Thanks to Deo Campos and the editors of Teoria Jurídica 
Contemporânea for invinting me to participate in this special issue.
Este ensaio propõe que os estudos jurídicos comparados podem superar sua atual 
crise de relevância reorientando-se para a crítica decolonial. Em artigo recente, 
condenando o estado atual da disciplina, Pierre Legrand argumentou que o direi-
to comparado está atolado em um estilo solipsista e ultrapassado do positivismo. 
Refletindo sobre os insights da teoria crítica, ele argumenta que a disciplina pode 
tornar-se mais relevante envolvendo-se em uma análise mais contextualizada da lei 
e incentivando a interpretação ativa para além de relatórios descritivos. Este ensaio 
amplia o argumento de Legrand para sugerir que um direito comparado emanci-
pado, incorporativo e interdisciplinar pode desempenhar um papel importante na 
decolonização mais ampla da doutrina jurídica. Fundado em um compromisso de 
restringir um impulso etnocêntrico no discurso legal, o direito comparado parece 
um local natural a partir do qual é possível desafiar as variedades do Eurocentrismo 
que continuam a definir a doutrina e a produção acadêmica jurídica e a explorar as 
raízes coloniais das formações raciais globalizadas.
Palavras-chave: Direito Comparado; Crítica Decolonial; Pierre Legrand; Teoria Crítica.
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While scholars of comparative law confront a crisis of relevance, law 
students themselves have been engaged in unusually creative acts 
of comparison.2 In the spring of 2015, the University of Cape Town 
erupted in protest as students demanded that the administration 
remove a statue of Cecil Rhodes from its campus. Rhodes founded 
one of the most profitable and most exploitive mining companies 
in the world before becoming Prime Minister of the Cape Colony 
in 1890. As Prime Minister, Rhodes introduced a series of laws 
designed to dispossess native Africans of their lands and put them 
to work for European landowners.3 When he died in 1902, Rhodes 
“donated” part of “his” estate to the University. He also bequeathed 
part of his vast fortune to the establishment of an international 
2  LEGRAND, 2017.
3  Cecil Rhodes, considered one of the architects of apartheid, instituted the Glen Grey Act 
of 1894, which deprived native South Africans of the opportunity to own land while imposing 
a tax on South Africans who could not prove wage employment. In a speech announcing the 
Act, Rhodes acknowledged that “there is . . . a general feeling that the natives are a distinct 
source of trouble and loss to the country.” S. AFR. HIST. ONLINE, 2016. But contrasting the native 
trouble in South Africa with the “labor trouble” in the United States and in England, Rhodes 
assured his countrymen, “I feel rather glad that the labor question here is connected with the 
native question.” S. AFR. HIST. ONLINE, 2016. Rhodes’ rhetoric should remind us that European 
imperialism has always proliferated comparisons—both on the part of those seeking to advance 
imperialism and those seeking to resist it.




















































exchange program to cultivate men for the service of expanding the 
British Empire—“the more of the world we inhabit, the better it is 
for the human race.”4 In an early draft of his will, Rhodes expressed 
his hope that a secret society would be created to bring the whole 
world under British rule.5 For the students demanding its removal, 
Rhodes’ statue represented the university’s fundamental complicity 
in perpetuating colonial legacies of white supremacy and imperial 
capitalism. The statue stood as a reminder of the many ways in 
which decolonization remains incomplete.6
The Rhodes Must Fall campaign quickly spread to other universities 
in South Africa. A Nigerian law student brought the movement to 
Oxford, where a statue of Rhodes hovers above the entrance to one 
of its colleges.7 Students at the University of the West Indies and the 
University of California at Berkeley issued statements of solidarity 
with their South African counterparts.8 At Yale University, students 
renewed old demands to rename one of its residential colleges — 
Calhoun College — named after a statesman and committed defender 
of slavery.9 At Princeton University, students stormed an administrative 
building and demanded that the university acknowledge the racist 
legacy of its former president, Woodrow Wilson, after which its School 
of Public and International Affairs is named.10 At Harvard Law School, 
students of color, taking encouragement from their counterparts in 
Cape Town and elsewhere, sounded calls to retire the law school 
shield, which had been modeled after the family crest of an eighteenth 
century slaveholder, Isaac Royall Jr., who amassed a fortune as the 
owner of a sugar plantation in Antigua.11 Royall devoted some of his 
4  In 1877, Rhodes reflected, “I contend that we are the first race in the world, and the more 
of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race. I contend that every acre added to 
our territory means the birth of more of the English race who otherwise would not have been 
brought into existence.” MEREDITH, 2018.
5  CHAUDHURI, 2016. 
6  The statue came down on April 9, 2016. BBC NEWS, 2016.
7  BBC NEWS, 2016.
8  RUSSELL POLLIT, S.J., 2015.
9  REMNICK, 2015.
10  As President of the United States, Wilson aggressively reversed many of the gains black 
Americans had achieved after the end of slavery, purging them from civil service positions while 
transforming the government “into an instrument of white supremacy.” N. Y. TIMES, 2015. 
Woodrow Wilson evidently “believed that black Americans were unworthy of full citizenship 
and admired the Ku Klux Klan for the role it had in terrorizing African Americans to restrict their 
political power.” N. Y. TIMES, 2015.
11  PARKER, 2016. HALLEY, 2008.




















































considerable wealth to establishing the first law professorship in the 
independent colonies.12
As observers note, the flames of protest that have since spread across 
elite universities in the United States were lit not in the college classroom 
but on the streets.13 In places like Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, 
Maryland, the highly publicized police execution of black men, 
women, and children ignited massive protests. The killings recorded 
on cell phone cameras brought no news to black and other persecuted 
minorities in the United States — black communities have long 
complained of the violence and humiliation they routinely experience 
at the hands of police — but they have forced other Americans to 
confront a set of realities often obscured by an unexamined faith in 
legal institutions.14 Protests against police violence in the United States 
have found resonance in France and Britain, which have their own, 
often unacknowledged, histories of racialized policing.15
Before universities in Texas and Kentucky quietly removed statues 
of slavery’s defenders, citizens of South Carolina once again 
demanded the removal of the Confederate flag waving above the 
state house.16 That was after a white young man entered a historic 
black church and shot nine parishioners. On his personal website, 
the killer posted photographs of himself holding a Confederate 
flag. He had sewn into his jacket—the one that he wore on the day 
he killed nine men and women in prayer—the flag of apartheid 
South Africa. He called his website The Last Rhodesian.17 A few 
days after the killing, tired of old debates, an artist named Bree 
Newsome climbed up the thirty-foot pole to bring down the 
offending flag herself. She later explained, “I removed the flag not 
only in defiance of those who enslaved my ancestors, but also in 
defiance of the oppression that continues against black people . . . 
I did it in solidarity with the South African students who toppled a 
statue of the white supremacist colonialist Cecil Rhodes.”18
12  HALLEY, 2008, 120.
13  NPR NEWSHOUR, 2015.
14  AKBAR, 2015.
15  ZAPPI, 2016; CHAN, 2016.
16  NEUMAN, 2015; BAILEY, 2016.
17  MADENGA, 2016.
18  TAYLOR, 2016.




















































As the legal process in one jurisdiction after another has failed to 
bring police officers to account for gunning down black and brown 
citizens, law students across the United States directed their anger at 
their own law schools, contrasting national expressions of grief and 
disgust with the relative silence of administrators and faculty.19 Law 
students at Georgetown University blamed a professional culture 
of “legal deference.”20 At Harvard Law School, students argued that 
“racial terror is systematically reproduced and normalized through 
fidelity to the so-called rule of law.”21 Addressing the law school 
administration, the students complained, “the fact that you refuse 
to openly acknowledge this adds to our distress.”22 They challenged 
the law school to conceive of itself as “not merely a school of law, 
but also a school of justice.”23
American law students were ridiculed for including in their letters 
of protest a plea for additional time to complete their exams. 
But behind their plea lies a more serious critique of law school 
curricula. Law students at Columbia University wrote to their 
administration, “in being asked to prepare for and take our exams 
at this moment, we are being asked to perform incredible acts 
of dissociation.”24 Learning to think like a lawyer, the students 
conveyed, required painful disorientation, a disavowal of personal 
experience, and deadening of moral intuition. “You cannot require 
that we . . . dedicate our energy in this moment to understanding 
and replicating the same legal maneuvers and language on our 
exams . . . that [are] used to deny justice.”25 To acknowledge the 
pain of psychic alienation is not a frivolous self-indulgence, as some 
have argued, but an essential preparation to resisting injustice, 
one belonging to a long tradition of anticolonial thought and race-
conscious critique.26 
While much of the conversation on campuses and in the media 
has focused on the reshuffling of statues and names, widening 
19  HAR. L. COALITION, 2014.
20  COALITION STUDENTS OF COLOR GEO. U. L. CTR, 2014.
21  HAR. L. COALITION, 2014.
22  HAR. L. COALITION, 2014.
23  HAR. L. COALITION, 2014 (emphasis added).
24  COALITION STUDENTS OF COLOR GEO. U. L. CTR, 2014 (emphasis added).
25  COALITION STUDENTS OF COLOR GEO. U. L. CTR, 2014.
26  DU BOIS, 1903; WOODSON, 1933; FANON, 1952; BIKO, 1978; WA THIONG’O, 1986.
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coalitions of students—from Cape Town to Chicago to New Delhi—
have expanded the scope of their demands to include diversifying 
the faculty, student body, and curriculum and democratizing 
access to higher education.27 The current student movement is not 
without its excesses and failures, but it has succeeded in posing 
a provocative and, as yet, unanswered question: what would 
it mean to decolonize our institutions of higher learning? What 
role do law schools have to play, given their unique capacity to 
prepare students for the practical elaboration of shared ideals? 
What would it mean for law schools to conceive of themselves as 
schools of justice? And how might comparative law address the 
call to decolonize our institutions and thought? “Not diversify,” as 
the students insist, but “decolonize.”28 
This essay will explore how a decolonizing critique might respond 
to or ground questions of concern to scholars of comparative 
law—perennial questions about the object and method of study, 
about our responsibility towards and recognition of difference, 
and about the relevance of comparative study to the societal 
exigencies of our particular moment. In the first Part of this essay, 
I introduce a compelling critique of comparative law scholarship, 
recently articulated by Pierre Legrand.  Drawing upon theoretical 
insights from philosophy and literary theory, Legrand argues that 
comparative law should embrace a more contextualized practice of 
reading law as well as more active interpretation. In the second Part, 
drawing upon my own training in literary theory and comparative 
literature, I extend his argument by identifying some of the ways 
in which an alternative approach to comparative law might play an 
important role in decolonizing legal scholarship.
I. THE CRITIQUE OF COMPARATIVE LAW
In his recent essay, “Jameses at Play,” Pierre Legrand stages 
a powerful intervention in comparative legal scholarship.29 
27  In Chicago, students and faculty have protested funding cuts and the threatened closure of 
Chicago State University, a public university primarily attended by working class black students, 
BOSMAN, 2016. In New Delhi, protests focused on the suppression of political speech against the 
Hindu nationalist party currently in office., BURKE, 2016.
28  CROCKER, 2016 (emphasis added).
29  LEGRAND, 2017.
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Legrand identifies two currents within the discipline: a traditional 
mainstream, which he associates with scientific positivism and 
disciplined reporting of legal rules; and a livelier countercurrent, 
characterized by contextualized study of legal rules, more active 
interpretation, and interdisciplinary engagement. Legrand 
is deeply critical of the former; the latter, he embraces and 
recommends as the path forward for comparative law.  Though 
styled primarily as an adjudication of a disagreement between 
two prominent figures within comparative law, each named James 
and each representative of one or the other disciplinary current,  I 
read his essay as an invitation to imagine a new and emancipated 
comparative law—one that might provide a home to decolonizing 
critique, as I suggest in the following section.30
Legrand begins by identifying what have always been the core values 
of a comparative approach to legal study: by inclining its practitioners 
towards the foreign and unfamiliar, comparativism becomes a 
way of suspending “self-centric and self-satisfied normality”; by 
disenchanting our most sacred institutions and disrupting intellectual 
routines, comparativism becomes a practice of repositioning oneself 
in the world and history.31 The comparativist’s commitment to 
honor difference, to represent the foreign with fidelity, enables her 
to resist both the “nationalizing and universalizing” impulses that 
govern so much legal scholarship.32 Comparative law, he writes, “is 
informed by an engagement with the world’s legal disparateness,” 
which it regards “as beneficial and indeed as normatively relevant.”33 
But Legrand worries that as comparative law scholars become 
preoccupied with policing what is or is not a proper object of study—
what it will or will not recognize to be “the law”—they lose sight of 
the intellectual and ethical value of comparative methods. 
Legrand opens his remarkably impassioned essay by confessing, “I 
have long felt profound intellectual discomfort and frustration that 
my professional existence should have been unfolding within a field 
that, in the main, has tended somewhat blatantly to keep even the 
most basic epistemic interrogations very safely out of the ambit of 
30  LEGRAND, 2017, 17-19.
31  LEGRAND, 2017, 1 (citation omitted).
32  LEGRAND, 2017, 1.
33  LEGRAND, 2017.




















































scholarly investigation.”34 His is an effort to revitalize comparative 
study, “to contribute to the redemption of epistemology within 
comparative law”35 by insisting upon a heightened self-reflection 
within the discipline. He urges his colleagues in comparative law 
to think critically about the conventions of knowledge-production 
that define the discipline, and the intellectual habits that allow only 
certain questions to be raised while banishing others. 
The main problem with comparative legal scholarship, Legrand 
asserts, is that it has become trapped by an excessive positivism, 
characterized by a narrowed focus on authorized legal texts and a 
committed indifference to almost everything else.36 In his words, 
according to the reigning orthodoxy, the comparative study of 
law should “remain squarely set on the rules—on what has been 
posited by authorized officials as ‘what the law is.’”37 These, in 
turn, should be represented in as “scientific” a manner as possible. 
This understanding of the discipline has encouraged comparative 
law scholars to produce dutifully descriptive accounts of cases 
and statutes, uncontaminated by either “political commitment 
or personal investment,” uncluttered by references to historical 
or cultural context, and free of authorial interpretation, critical or 
otherwise.38 They regard their task as one of “arrang[ing] the law in 
the form of an orderly, coherent, and systematic representation of 
the different rules in force, largely applying them at the behest of 
the state.”39 
Legrand is appropriately skeptical of the positivist’s pretensions to 
scientific objectivity. But the positivist, he argues, can only fulfill 
his claim to pure objectivity by denaturing his object of study.  In 
the positivist’s construction, law is made to appear rational and 
coherent; law is cleansed of its essential ambiguity, indeterminacy, 
and inconsistency. At the same time, by imagining that man-
34  LEGRAND, 2017, 18.
35  LEGRAND, 2017.
36  To be clear, the “positivism” to which Legrand and I refer here is not the positivism of John 
Austin nor the positivism the positive law/natural law debates in which most American lawyers 
are schooled. Instead, positivism here refers to a set of epistemological conventions defining of 
scientific rationality in the western world since the early nineteenth century. Rather than legal 
positivism, it is logical or scientific positivism at which Legrand primarily takes aim.
37  LEGRAND, 2017, 4.
38  LEGRAND, 2017, 4, 60.
39  LEGRAND, 2017, 4.




















































made laws operate as naturally or with the same autonomy as the 
Pythagorean theorem, positivists invest their own science of legal 
reasoning with a transcendental quality while effacing the contests 
and contingencies that have allowed legal reasoning to proceed as 
a self-authorizing force. 
Just as positivists attribute to their law-object an internal purity, 
they assume that legal objects come with clear external boundaries. 
In their view, law is clearly distinguishable from not-law. As Legrand 
writes, positivists “regard the legal aspect of an issue as discrete 
and as crisply detachable from its other dimensions.” But here, 
too, positivist legal discourse maintains its conceptual clarity only 
by suppressing historical contingencies, cultural contaminations, 
and so on. And by refusing to look beyond the usual parameters of 
legal discourse, to explore the conditions that give rise to its own 
knowledge conventions, the positivist fails to acknowledge the 
contingency of both his object and method of study. 
For Legrand, the most concerning feature of positivism in legal 
scholarship is that it maintains its authority by excluding challenge. 
It safeguards its rationality and coherence by denying and 
devaluing certain forms of inquiry—particularly those that are 
most disruptive of its internal logic and order. As Legrand writes, 
“certain knowledge is banished from the sphere of significance, and 
some issues are made never to arise, therefore allowing for . . . an 
ultimately immaculate development of internal heuristic processes 
generating ultimately immaculate legal results.”40 By insulating itself 
from outside challenge, by refusing to question its own working 
assumptions, positivism within legal discourse becomes an entirely 
self-referencing and self-replicating epistemic regime.41 It replicates 
itself in law schools by cultivating a particular mindset in new 
students. As Legrand puts it:
The positivist mind channels the energies of law schools and of law tea-
chers into the career preparation of students in a manner that ensures 
the solidification and the perpetuation of the existing institutional or-
der through the annual “delivery” of sets of mentally homogenous and 
socially receptive individuals pliably disposed to apprehend the law as 
40  LEGRAND, 2017, 6-7.
41  LEGRAND, 2017, 7.




















































consisting in a set of textual commands requiring but (sophisticated?) 
technical mastery.42 
I want to suggest that the students of color who resist sitting for 
their criminal law exams while police killing continues unabated and 
unredressed—those students escape Legrand’s critical description. 
Those students explain that they did not want to participate in 
the ideological reproduction of the status quo by mastering rules 
that, for instance, allow police officers to use deadly force against 
innocent and unarmed men and women. 
But many law students do fit Legrand’s description. For instance, 
last year, students at one American law school complained to their 
criminal law professor that the statement “Black Lives Matter,” worn 
on her t-shirt, “was an inappropriate and unnecessary statement that 
has no legitimate place within our institution of higher learning.”43 
In an anonymous letter that has since been widely circulated, the 
students explained, “We are here to learn the law”:
This is not a political science class or college. We are a law school. We 
have undertaken the solemn duty to learn and respect the law. We do 
not need the mindless actions of our professors to distract and alienate 
us. Just as our personal beliefs have no place in law exams, your perso-
nal beliefs have no place in the classroom.”44
The students’ confidence that law school has nothing to do with 
politics or personal belief; that they can learn criminal law without 
having to be distracted by assertions about black humanity; that as 
the “solemn” keepers of the profession, they owe nothing to those 
who challenge its effects—these are all symptoms of the epistemic 
enclosure of which Legrand warns. History, other people, and 
conscience—these become someone else’s problem.
Notwithstanding its claim to objectivity and ideological innocence, 
positivism is always political.45 There is, of course, a politics to 
sanctioning indifference by policing disciplinary boundaries. In the 
United States, as in other contexts, racial inequality is sustained 
by historical amnesia and, often, by an unexamined faith in the 
42  LEGRAND, 2017.
43 JASCHIK, 2016 (including links to both the students’ complaint and the professor’s response).
44  JASCHIK, 2016.
45  LEGRAND, 2017, 7.




















































essential goodness of law. Positivists promote the view that law has 
within itself the resources to gradually perfect itself, “through the 
self-regulatory and teleologically ordained use of the posited.”46 
In this sense, positivism in legal discourse tends uncomfortably 
towards authoritarianism. It is more concerned with a respect 
for governing authority than it is with the expression of governed 
collectivities. 
To redeem the comparative study of law, Legrand argues, 
comparativists should muddy the pristine waters of the positivist 
mainstream by engaging in two kinds of dredging—what he calls 
“enculturation” and interpretation.47  The comparative law scholar 
should free himself of the positivist’s demand for certainty and 
embrace the essential unruliness of legal texts and legal culture. He 
should abandon the notion that law can be purified of its internal 
deficits (ambiguities, inconsistencies, and indeterminacies) or cleaved 
of its external contaminations (of history and culture) and instead 
recognize law to be “a massively incorporative cultural formation.”48 
Legal texts, like all other texts, Legrand writes, “exist as intertextual 
matrices . . . as interfaces where arrays of discursive threads have 
interlaced to be absorbed and transformed in order to be made to 
speak legally.”49 The fabric of any legal text consists of 
“… historical configurations enmeshed with traces of political rationa-
lities intertwined with traces of social logics interwoven with traces of 
philosophical postulates plaited with traces of linguistic orders darned 
with traces of economic prescriptions interlaced with traces of episte-
mic assumptions..”
and so on.50 While descriptive positivism limits itself to endlessly 
reinscribing a legal text with a particular significance, encultured 
interpretation opens the text to re-signification. Legrand reminds us 
that the meaning of a legal text is never exhausted by its authorized 
or official interpretation. On the contrary, when confronted with 
multiplicity of meanings contained in any legal text, the scholar 
is confronted with an inescapable choice, an ethical judgment. 
46  LEGRAND, 2017, 7.
47  LEGRAND, 2017, 21.
48  LEGRAND, 2017, 44. 
49  LEGRAND, 2017, 40. 
50  LEGRAND, 2017, 41.




















































He can either attend to the difference, the newness, or the challenge 
presented by the trace, and thereby “do justice” to it. Or he can 
ignore it. But by refusing to address the hidden trace discovered in a 
legal text—the trace of an imperial logic, for instance, or older racial 
episteme—the scholar participates in its silencing and erasure.
Encultured interpretation also pluralizes the position of the legal 
scholar or, as Legrand puts it, “necessarily encultured texts must 
be read by necessarily encultured interpreters.”51 Encultured 
interpretation unravels the Cartesian dualism, which holds the 
knowing subject apart from the known world, and restores the subject 
to the world of relation. While the objective knower is imagined to 
look out upon the world, as if from an enclosed and transcending 
perspective, encultured reading reminds us that “individuals are 
part of a community”—and a particular community.52 Encultured 
interpretation forces the legal scholar to acknowledge the ways 
in which the confinements of language, culture, and experience 
structure his knowing. 
II. ANOTHER COMPARISON
Legrand’s intervention thus comes at a critical time, when an 
already violent and unequal world finds itself lapsing into a 
tribal nationalism, as the calls for racial redress first sounded in 
marginalized communities make their way from college campuses 
into law school classrooms, and as law schools themselves 
redefine their purpose in the aftermath of the global economic 
crisis and the ascendance of authoritarianism. The question now 
looming before many law schools is whether they should narrow 
their conception of professional training to render graduates more 
competitive within the existing legal market, or whether they have 
a responsibility to encourage students to think more expansively 
about their role as global citizens and the relationship between 
law and justice.
After identifying some of the intellectual hazards posed by the kind 
of positivism governing the comparative study of law—including 
epistemic blindness, authoritarian inclination, and indifference 
51  LEGRAND, 2017, 53.
52  LEGRAND, 2017, 19.




















































towards otherness—Legrand advocates a general opening up of the 
discipline, mainly through a committed practice of contextual reading, 
interpretation, and interdisciplinarity.53  In this essay, I want to amplify 
his call by drawing upon a tradition of critical self-reflection, now 
well established in another field of comparative study, comparative 
literature. And in so doing, I want to propose that an emancipated, 
incorporative, and interdisciplinary comparative law might play an 
important role in decolonizing and democratizing legal thought. 
More than fifty years ago, René Wellek, a leading figure in comparative 
literature, issued a set of complaints about the state of his discipline—
complaints that now resonate with Legrand’s. Wellek observed that 
comparative literature had long been “saddled with an obsolete 
methodology,” one characterized by a “factual positivism” on the 
one hand, and nationalist arrogance on the other.54 He suggested 
that, in an anxious effort to establish a distinct methodology, 
comparative literature became bogged down by attempts to 
“emulate the general scientific ideals of objectivity, impersonality, 
and certainty,” and to “imitate the methods of natural science by a 
study of causal antecedents and origins.”55 Comparative literature, 
in Wellek’s account, consumed with exhaustive accumulation of 
the “minutest details” of authors’ reading habits and meticulous 
influence tracking, had regressed into a form of cultural accounting, 
a bookkeeping of national credits and debts.56 
For Wellek, the problem was the perceived pressure to compare. 
The discipline could free itself of its obsolete and burdensome 
methods by abandoning the practice of comparison itself.57 Wellek 
acknowledged that comparative literature had done an admirable 
job of “combatting the false isolation of national literary histories” 
by showing European literary traditions to belong to a unified web 
of interrelation.58 But Wellek doubted that the study of literature “in 
comparison” was distinguishable from or more valuable than the 
study of literature “in general.” Moreover, he argued, there is no 
53  DEMLEITNER, 1999; FRANKENGERG, 1985.
54  WELLEK, 1963a, 285-290.
55  WELLEK, 1963b, 256-257.
56  WELLEK, 1963b.
57  WELLEK, 1963a, 283.
58  WELLEK, 1963a.




















































single way to approach a literary or cultural text—or a political or 
legal text, for that matter. In remarkably sweeping terms, he argued, 
“there are no proprietary rights and no recognized ‘vested interests’ 
in literary scholarship. Everybody has the right to study any question 
even if it is confined to a single work in a single language and 
everybody has the right to study even history or philosophy or any 
other topic.”59 
By suggesting that his colleagues abandon the “artificial distinction 
between ‘comparative’ and ‘general’ literature,” Wellek did not 
rid comparative literature of its methodological anxieties or 
preoccupations. On the contrary, his intervention seemed to intensify 
both.60 The “factual positivism” of which Wellek complained was 
almost immediately superseded by new forms of critical thinking—
post-structuralism and deconstruction, feminism and psychoanalysis, 
postcolonialism and new historicism. With the introduction of 
critical theory, comparative literature took a fundamental turn, 
away from a traditional training in cultural heritage towards a more 
thoroughgoing investigation of “the contemporary conditions of 
knowledge production,” as Stathis Gourgouris writes.61 
Through its engagement with critical theory in the late 1960s, 
comparative literature transformed itself into one of the most 
compelling sites of intellectual production in the university, 
generating powerful tools for challenging previously unassailable 
conventions and enabling scholars across the humanities and 
social sciences to examine the logocentric, ethnocentric, and 
gendered biases that have sustained western thought since the 
enlightenment.62 Though the forms of critical theory associated 
with comparative literature have generated more than their share 
of controversy, exasperation, and attack, most scholars would have 
to acknowledge that critical theory has radically transformed the 
university itself, particularly in the United States.63 As Gourgouris 
writes, the turn to critical theory inaugurated in American 
universities “a fecund period of experimental practices of radical 
59  WELLEK, 1963a, 290.
60  BERNHEIMER, 1996a.
61  GOURGORIS, 2011.
62  GOURGORIS, 2011, 76–77.
63  SAUSSY, 2006.
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interrogation, subversion of established modes of interpretation, 
daring cognitive ingenuity, and irreverent performativity. It was 
thus profoundly political, if nothing else in the barest sense of 
exposing unquestioned domains in the structures of power (of 
both domination and liberation) and producing new modes of 
consciousness as to what constitutes authority and agency.”64 
Even as the theoretical paradigms developed within comparative 
literature gain influence beyond the borders of the discipline, 
comparative literature itself continues to submit to periodic self-
examination of precisely the sort that Legrand now recommends for 
comparative law. Since 1965, the American Comparative Literature 
Association, in accordance with its own bylaws, has produced a 
report on the state of the discipline roughly every ten years. The 
purpose of the report is to encourage continued reflection on the 
intellectual mission of the discipline and, increasingly, its relation 
to its historical moment. The 1965 report championed broad 
linguistic competency; the 1975 report emphasized interdisciplinary 
engagement and challenged the elitist preoccupation with 
“standards” in the previous report.65 The 1985 report was never 
published, perhaps attesting to the realization that the existing form, 
“a report on standards,” had become inadequate to its task.66 The 
1995 report advocated “a broadening of the cultural scope” of the 
discipline and active recruitment of faculty with expertise beyond 
European literatures. The 2006 report, offered as a “multi-vocal 
report” including statements from nineteen authors reflecting a 
growing diversity of voices and perspectives, focused on two models 
of comparativism gaining currency in the field: “world literature” and 
“the politics of empire.”67 The most recent report, published in 2015, 
further explodes the convention: presented as a website, it includes 
dozens of short essays (and videos), from authors responding to an 
open call (rather than invitation), under five broad themes (including 
“Ideas of the Decade,” “Facts and Figures,” “Paradigms,” “Practices,” 
and “Futures”).68 
64  GOURGORIS, 2011, 77.
65  BERNHEIMER, 1996b, 21; BERNHEIMER, 1996c, 28.
66  BERNHEIMER, 1996a, 1.
67  SAUSSY, 2006, vii.
68  AM. COMPARATIVE LITERATURE ASS’N, 2015.




















































These reports chart variety of intellectual trajectories which 
comparative law scholars might pursue. At the very least, they 
plot an escape from the epistemic enclosure that now frustrates 
the development of comparative legal scholarship. There are four 
particular exits that I would like to point out, but in general, the 
vision I want to put forth is of a broadly expanded comparative 
law, one that assumes a leading role in addressing an entrenched 
Eurocentrism in legal discourse while providing hospitable ground 
for a variety of critical and interdisciplinary projects, especially those 
that might join in the effort to decolonize higher education and to 
project alternative, more equitable forms of coexistence. 
A. Beyond Comparing 
One of the great lessons learned by comparative literature scholars, 
and one that may come as a relief to comparative law scholars, 
is that the discipline does not have to forever shackle itself to 
that increasingly ill-fitting adjective, comparative.69 Observation, 
comparison, and classification may have been the most respectable 
methods of knowledge-production in the eighteenth century, but 
no longer. Some legal scholars may have good reason to organize 
their research around a comparison of the laws of different 
jurisdictions, but it is not merely the practice of juxtaposition that 
defines comparative law but a certain intellectual, and ultimately 
ethical, orientation. That same orientation—an inclination towards 
difference and defamiliarization—might lead comparativists towards 
new critical insights. Within the field of comparative literature, 
the related habit of self-examination has proven to be especially 
productive, encouraging students and scholars to continuously 
expand the field by redefining its intellectual mission as well as its 
contemporary relevance.70 
In the past decade, a number of scholars and departments have be-
gun to experiment with the idea of recasting comparative literature 
as “world literature,” though not without appropriate hesitation.71 
69  BROOKS, 1994.
70  BEHDAD; THOMAS, 2011, 3.
71  The main worry, of course, is that western literature is merely reinscribed or aggrandized as 
“world literature.” In 1960, Swiss comparatist Werner Friedrich cautioned that “world literature 
is a presumptuous and arrogant term. Sometimes, I think we should call our program NATO 
literatures. Yet even that would be extravagant, for we do not usually deal with more than one 
quarter of the NATO-nations.” SPIVAK; DAMROSCH, 2014.
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Others have recommended a more cautious “worlding” approach to 
literature, or one that situates literary cultures globally and assumes 
a worldly perspective.72 In comparative literature, this has meant 
turning away from questions about how ideas traveled from France 
to England and vice versa, to investigate (rather than actively ignore) 
how the oriental rug, among other forms of opulence, came to fur-
nish the rooms in Jane Austen’s novels;73 or how the madwoman 
in the attic, in Charlotte Brontë’s novel, lost her mind on a Carib-
bean plantation.74 In other words, a worldly orientation to familiar 
texts has prompted scholars to explore how the long and repressed 
entanglement between Europe and its colonies variously shapes 
our ideas, institutions, and domestic arrangements. Within legal 
scholarship, a similar worlding of legal texts might involve thinking 
critically about the ways in which the U.S. Constitution enshrines 
the very particular priorities of a colonial settler society.75  Or how 
the institution of marriage has been shaped by a dread of foreign 
blood.76 Writing from within the neighboring field of comparative 
legal history, Thomas Duve promotes a method that emphasizes the 
“ineradicable interconnectedness” or mutual “entanglement” of 
seemingly disparate peoples, places, and cultures.77 
In the alternative, comparative law might embrace the notion that 
all study is comparative. Particularly in the humanities, but not just 
in the humanities, academic work involves the task of studying the 
variance between a particular construction of the world and some 
alternative experience of it.  Historians often seek to challenge a 
prevailing narrative of the past.  Social scientists may test a particular 
image of human behavior—as projected in legal reasoning, or in an 
economic model, a religious verse, and so on—against some form 
72  KADIR, 2014, 264. Of course, the odd choice of word, “worlding,” is deliberate in that it avoids 
the more familiar “globalizing,” which celebrates “the imposition of the same system of exchange 
everywhere.” SPIVAK, 2003. Gayatri Spivak, for this reason, offers up the even odder term of 
“planetarity” to conjure an alternative, as a yet unrealized relationship to the planet and to one 
another. “The globe is on our computers. No one lives there. It allows us to think that we can 
aim to control it. The planet is in the species of alterity, belonging to another system; and yet we 
inhabit it on loan . . . When I invoke the planet, I think of the effort required to figure the (im)




76  DUBLER, 2006; GROSS, 2010; PASCOE, 2009.
77  DUVE, 2014.




















































of counterevidence. The model of knowledge production here looks 
outward, allowing us to test a particular image of the world —
presented in law, history, economics — against alternatives.
David Ferris, a literary scholar, recovers such an alternative and 
more expansive model of comparison in Aristotle’s Poetics.78 In 
his Poetics, Aristotle suggests that human beings enjoy looking at 
representations of the world (or “likeness” [eikonas]) because “as we 
look, we learn and infer.”79 Aristotle goes on to identify two modes 
of comparison. The first, identified with history, is “closed” because 
it limits itself to fact and evidence, or what already happened. The 
second, identified with poetry, is more open in that “it is defined in 
terms of possibility,” or what could have happened.80 But this second 
mode of comparison is not entirely open in that it is bound by the 
condition of possibility; poesis cannot entirely exceed the factual, 
evidentiary constraints of historia. Aristotle continues to explain, 
then, why poesis, an interpretive “making,” is a better instrument of 
knowledge than historia: 
The writings of Herodotus could be put into verse and yet would still be 
a kind of history, whether written in meter or not. The real difference is 
this: that one tells what happened and the other what might happen. 
For this reason, poetry is something more scientific and serious than 
history, because poetry tends to give general truths while history parti-
cular facts.81 
Ferris suggests to his colleagues in comparative literature that 
the irritating adjective “comparative” might stand for the sort of 
orientation that Aristotle describes, an orientation towards general 
truths—still rigorously grounded in historical fact but ultimately 
concerned with possibility. By comparing, in this general sense, we 
develop an understanding not only of “what the world is,” to invoke 
Legrand’s discussion, but what it may become. In this same vein, 
a more expansive comparative law might choose for its object the 
variance to which several law students refer in a number of their 
statements—the variance between law’s image of the world and 
others’ experience of it, and the variance between law and justice. 
78  FERRIS, 2011, 28.
79  FERRIS, 2011, 36 (quoting Aristotle).
80  FERRIS, 2011.
81  FERRIS, 2011, 37 (quoting Aristotle); SPIVAK, 2002.
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B. Decentering Europe, Recognizing Others 
Scanning the chapter titles of recent anthologies, which we might 
take to represent the current state of comparative law, one cannot 
help but notice that there is painfully little discussion about legal 
cultures outside of Europe. Reflecting upon the lack of diversity 
represented in comparative literature departments in the 1960s, 
Sukehiro Hirakawa described the field to his colleagues in Japan 
as “a sort of Greater West European Co-Prosperity Sphere.”82 
Forty years later, the same phrase might describe the scope of 
comparative legal study. Two philosophy professors in the United 
States, observing that the majority of philosophy departments 
offer not a single course on “African, Indian, Islamic, Jewish, Latin 
American, Native American or other non-European traditions,” 
recently chastized their disciplines for their parochialism and 
suggested that departments rename themselves to better reflect 
their curriculum: they should call themselves departments of 
“European and American Philosophy.”83 Again, comparative law 
remains vulnerable to the same admonition. 
The Eurocentrism of comparative study, in the United States at 
least, reflects the different histories through which Europe and non-
Europe entered American universities. Both comparative literature 
and comparative law in the United States were built by European 
immigrants, many of them intellectuals fleeing authoritarian 
regimes.84 Asia, Africa, and Latin America, by contrast, entered the 
university primarily through area studies departments, which were 
tasked primarily with producing knowledge of the Third World for 
eventual strategic use. As Gayatri Spivak puts it, “U.S. comparative 
literature was founded on inter-European hospitality, [while] 
Area Studies had been spawned by interregional vigilance.”85 
Comparative literature has widened its purview in the past several 
decades—partly in response to recommendations resulting from 
one of the discipline’s regular self-examinations, and partly as a 
result of the powerful role that postcolonial critique has played 
in expanding the scope of not just literary studies but, again, the 
82  SPIVAK; DAMROSCH, 2014, 364 (David Damrosch citing Sukehiro Hirakawa).
83  GARFIELD; VAN NORDEN, 2016.
84  SPIVAK, 2003, 8; REIMANN, 1998.
85  SPIVAK, 2003, 8.




















































humanities in general.86 Comparative law, by contrast—and despite 
the efforts of many in the field—remains resolutely Eurocentric.87 
Eurocentrism here is not merely an excessive focus on Europe and 
its New World outposts—“the West.” Rather, the term refers to a 
set of knowledge conventions that provide the implicit foundation 
and justification for the western domination of non-western others. 
Eurocentrism may describe conventional research models in which 
the West is cast as the agent of universal history and the rest are 
measured in term of their resemblance to It. Or it may refer to the 
confidence that the West is the ultimate source of enlightenment 
in the modern world, of ideas like freedom and equality.88 But in 
the broadest sense, Eurocentrism refers to the general habit of 
attributing authority to only certain forms of knowledge—what we 
might generally refer to as western rationality—while disregarding 
and disparaging others. 
The positivism that Legrand attributes to comparative law also 
participates in a fallacy that has sustained colonial reasoning 
since its beginning—the Cartesian fallacy through which the 
knower knows himself to be detached from the known world. 
The contemporary philosopher, Achille Mbembe, explains that 
western epistemic traditions, to which positivism belongs, rest on 
“a division between mind and the world, or between reason and 
nature as an ontological a priori.” 89 Mbembe explains that these 
“are traditions in which the knowing subject is enclosed in itself 
and peeks out at the world of objects and produces supposedly 
objective knowledge of those objects. The knowing subject is thus 
able, we are told, to know the world without being part of that 
world.”90 The problem with this tradition, Mbembe argues, is that 
86  BERNHEIMER, 1996d, 39 (recommending that language study might be extended beyond 
the “classical” languages to include students’ native languages; that scholars and teachers study 
canon formation and reconceive the canon; that departments should “plan an active role in 
furthering the multicultural recontextualization of Anglo-American and European perspectives”. 
BERNHEIMER, 1996d at [pincite].). 
87  MARKESINIS, 2003 (dismissing charges of Eurocentrism as “trendy” “political correctness”; 
defending it by suggesting that “the most developed ideas” or legal systems deserve more 
“careful study” than more “primitive” ones).
88  For this reason, as some have demonstrated, comparative legal scholarship that focuses on 
the “reception” of Anglo-European law in other parts of the world does not escape the charge 
of Eurocentrism. LANGER, 2004.
89  MBEMBE, 2015.
90  MBEMBE, 2015.




















































“it has become hegemonic.” On the one hand, “it has generated 
discursive scientific practices and has set up interpretive frames 
that make it difficult to think outside of these frames”; on the other 
hand, “it actively represses anything that actually is articulated, 
thought and envisioned from outside of these frames.”91 Positivism, 
like Eurocentrism, is pernicious in that it tends to insulate itself 
from counter-knowledge, remains assured of its own truth, as it 
naturalizes the conditions that sustain its authority. 
Generations of critics have observed that “Europe” has an uncanny 
capacity to attribute to itself the accomplishments of other non-
European societies.  W.E.B. Du Bois, for instance, quipped, “Why, 
then, is Europe great?  Because of the foundations which the mighty 
past have furnished her to build upon: the iron trade of ancient, 
black Africa, the religion and empire-building of yellow Asia, the art 
and science of the ‘dago’ Mediterranean shore…”92  More recently, 
scholars remind us that post-structuralist and deconstructive 
critique, which now assume a certain prestige in the western 
academy as “high” theory, were themselves shaped by the anti-
imperial movements of the early twentieth century.  When scholars 
locate the origins of critical theory in France in 1968, for instance, 
they forget that “French theory” drew much of its revolutionary 
character from Maoism and its negative dialectic from anticolonial 
critics like Franz Fanon and Aimé Césaire.93 And long before American 
academics discovered Foucault, generations of black radicals had 
written devastating accounts of the complicities between knowledge 
and power. In Jacques Derrida’s seminal Of Grammatology, the word 
“ethnocentrism” appears before “logocentrism,” but it is the latter 
term that is now rooted at the center of critical theory.94 As critical 
theory limits its regard to the minute operations of elite discourse 
and distances itself from earlier forms of race-conscious critique, 
critical theory risks reproducing the very ethnocentric self-enclosure 
that it once intended to disrupt.95 
91  MBEMBE, 2015.
92  DU BOIS, 1999.
93  WOLIN, 2012; CHOW, 2012; FANON, 1961; CÉSAIRE, 1972.
94  SPIVAK, 2016.
95  LIONNET, SHIH, 2005.
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C. The Minor and Transnational
Comparative study has long been guided by an impulse to dislodge 
and dismantle the national frameworks that organize scholarship 
in traditional fields. In recent decades, scholars working across a 
range of disciplines have shattered the conventional framework of 
analysis beyond the nation-state to explore the many relationships 
that minoritized subjects forge with one another across national 
boundaries. 
In an earlier essay, I proposed that comparative law might unsettle an 
entrenched nationalism in legal discourse by promoting study of not 
just the foreignness that one discovers beyond national borders, but 
the foreignness that lies within a nation’s borders.96 What I described 
as “minor comparativism” shares with traditional comparative 
law scholarship a commitment to challenging and expanding the 
understanding of one’s own legal culture by embracing a foreign 
perspective. But it departs from more traditional scholarship in that 
it does not compare the legal culture of one state with another. 
Instead, it sets the official image of a legal culture, one authorized by 
the nation-state, against the reflections of its minoritized subjects.97 
My own essay sought to challenge the United States’ self image, 
as a nation of immigrants, one founded in the dream of universal 
inclusion, by engaging the self-published writings of an Indian 
immigrant who was subject to denaturalization by the American 
government and lived under constant threat of racial exclusion. 
Observing that the study of minority communities is often framed 
in terms of their “vertical” relationship to a national majority, 
Lionnet and Shih advocate a model of comparativism that situates 
minority communities in horizontal relation with one another.98 
In the United States, for instance, the standard narrative of racial 
progress is one in which a succession of black, immigrant, and 
indigenous groups travel separate but parallel paths to citizenship 
and inclusion. Even the most critical accounts of racial formation 
in the United States reproduce implicit binaries of opposition/
assimilation, exclusion/inclusion, colored/white. But both the 
96  MUNSHI, 2015.
97  MUNSHI, 2015, 665. See also COHEN, 2018.
98  LIONNET, SHIH, 2005, 2,7.




















































standard and critical accounts end up reinscribing the supposed 
universality of American social and political institutions and the 
essential particularity of its ethnic minorities. 
Nation-centered accounts of minorities also efface the historic 
relationships between racialized minorities as well as their potential 
collaborations, particularly with respect to their shared confrontation 
with colonialism and its legacies. For instance, as W.E.B. Du Bois 
came to recognize that the problem of the color line in the United 
States was “but a local phase of the world problem,” he reflected 
that a potential solidarity among the darker peoples of the world had 
been forestalled by a lack of knowledge about one another.99 In his 
1935 essay, “Indians and American Negros,” Du Bois acknowledged 
that black Americans knew almost nothing about the decolonization 
movement in India, other than what British newspapers reported. 
Likewise, what Indians knew of black Americans was limited to “the 
conventional story spread by most white American and English 
writers: ignorant black savages were enslaved . . . they were finally 
emancipated by a benevolent government and given every aid 
to rise and develop.”100 It was only through personal contact and 
exchange that black radicals and Indian anticolonialists began 
to learn from one another that they shared a common history of 
colonial displacement and that they might collaborate to imagine a 
postcolonial future. 
A number of scholars working across national, linguistic, and 
disciplinary boundaries have begun to explore the dynamic 
relationships—collaborations as well as contestations—between 
minoritized groups, in settings that scale from the intimate to the 
global.101 These scholars recast minorities within an expanded and 
complicated field of transnational networks, diasporic attachments, 
and interethnic solidarity. Intellectual and political movements that 
had previously been rendered scattered and discrete—mainly by 
disciplinary conventions that stabilize the study of national histories 
and cultures—have been brought together within experimental 
frameworks that might generally be described as transnational. 
99  DU BOIS, 1995.
100 DU BOIS, 1936.
101  Some recent monographs include BALD, 2013; BURTON, 2016; EDWARDS, 1003; HORNE, 
2008; LOWE, 2015; SHAH, 2011; SINGH, 2005; SLATE, 2012.




















































For instance, in her remarkably ambitious volume, The Slave’s Cause: 
A History of Abolition, Manisha Sinha offers a startling counter-
narrative of the long struggle to end slavery in the United States, 
broadening her frame of reference far beyond the people and 
places generally associated with abolition to trace the influence of 
the Haitian Revolution in shaping the movement for emancipation 
in the United States. She describes a radical and incorporative 
movement in which “men and women, black and white, free and 
enslaved found common ground in causes ranging from feminism 
and utopian socialism to anti-imperialism and efforts to defend the 
rights of labor.”102 Sinha challenges conventional wisdom by asserting 
that “slave resistance, and not bourgeois liberalism, lay at the heart 
of the movement.”103 At the same time, she reverses Eurocentric 
assumptions about the agents of enlightenment, freedom, and 
equality in the modern world. 
An expansive comparative law might make itself home to 
similarly ambitious legal scholarship, scholarship that identifies 
sources of not just moral but legal authority that lie far beyond 
the posited law and in the collective capacities of ordinary men 
and women. Hannah Arendt located this generative authority in 
public engagement. In The Human Condition, she wrote, “the only 
indispensable material factor in the generation of power is the 
living together of people . . . Whenever people gather together, 
it is potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and 
not forever.”104 A comparative law that challenges law’s faith in its 
own perfectibility, I want to suggest, might open itself to a better 
understanding of how law is more radically transformed.105 At the 
same time, it would preserve and nurture the fragile potential that 
Arendt describes, the potential to transform our world through 
radically democratic engagement. In this sense, comparative law 
might conceive of itself as a discipline that preserves both past and 
future—reminding us of past generations’ hope for a genuinely 
postcolonial future, while cultivating the legal, political, and ethical 
capacities that will be required of that world to come. 
102  SINHA, 2016.
103  SINHA, 2016, 1.
104  ARENDT, 1998, 199.
105  AKBAR, 2015.




















































D. Race in Relation
Scholars and activists interested in exploring the contingencies of 
racial forms have long turned to comparative methods to broaden 
their framework of analysis.106 Comparing the history of segregation 
and its aftermath in the United States to the experience of apartheid 
in South Africa, for instance, may help Americans to expose otherwise 
normalized forms of racial governmentality or expand our sense of 
political possibility. So might a comparison of immigration policies 
in the United States and Australia alert Americans to otherwise 
imperceptible shifts in political rationality or government tactics.107 
But traditional models of comparison that juxtapose the legal 
culture of one state against that of another often take for granted 
the current organization of the world, seen, as on world maps, as 
an “inherently fragmented space, divided by different colors into 
diverse national societies, each rooted in its proper place.”108 By 
leaving unexamined the relationship between racial formation and 
the contemporary nation-state system, nation-centered models of 
comparison may conceal as much as they reveal. 
For this reason, David Theo Goldberg recommends an approach that 
is “relational” rather than comparative.109 Goldberg distinguishes 
the nation-centered models of comparison that have taken shape 
with academic departments from another tradition of political 
thinkers—including Arendt and Du Bois, among many others—
whose investigations of race and racism invariably lead to the colonial 
roots of the contemporary nation-state form.110 Goldberg writes, 
“what a relational account adds . . . is not just the historical legacy. 
It enables one to see how the colonial shaped the contemporary, 
planted racism’s roots in place, designed its social conditions and 
cemented its structural arrangements.”111 Postcolonial critics remind 
us that the colonies were sites of legal experimentation in which 
European powers invented new forms of sovereignty and rights 
of contract and property, spatial orders and regulated intimacies, 
106  A few recent examples in comparative law scholarship include BHANDAR, 2018; COTTROL, 
2013; HERNANDEZ, 2016; MAWANI, 2009; PRASHAD, 2000; MCKINLEY, 2016; RUSKOLA, 2013.
107  MOUNTZ, 2010.
108  GUPTA, 2008.
109  GOLDBERG, 2011, 357.
110  DU BOIS, 1915, 707; ARENDT, 1998, 128.
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racialized communities and subjects for management and control.112 
As Goldberg writes, “it’s not that racism is reducible only to some 
narrow connection to colonial subjection and repression, ordering 
and governmentality. Colonial outlooks, interests, dispositions, and 
arrangements nevertheless set the tone and terms, its frameworks 
for conceiving and thinking about the possibility for engaging and 
distancing, exploiting and governing, admitting and administering 
those conceived as racially distinct and different.”113 Social practices 
invented in the colonies did not always remain in the colonies. 
Practices of biometric identification invented in colonial India—
the fingerprint, most famously—would become a routine part of 
criminal investigation in Europe and eventually everywhere.114 
Arendt famously argued that the efficiencies and brutalities 
rehearsed in colonial Africa were but “a preparatory stage for coming 
catastrophe” in Europe.115 
For Goldberg, a relational approach to race and racism allows us to 
recover the colonial roots of contemporary, globalized racial forms. 
At the same time, it reminds us that race cannot be understood 
in isolation or as an aberration; it saturates the nation-state and 
its organization of the world. Where “a comparativist account 
undertakes to reveal through analogy” across nations or states, 
Goldberg suggests, “a relational account reveals through indicating 
how effects are brought about as the result of historical political 
or economic, legal or cultural links, the one acting upon another.” 
Where “a comparativist account contrasts and compares,” “a 
relational account connects, materially and affectively, causally and 
implicatively.”116 
Let me conclude by illustrating the value of relational investigation 
in the context of immigration law. One of few legal academic 
texts devoted to the comparison of immigration laws, a volume 
entitled Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, surveys the 
immigration laws of fifteen countries, which the editors divide into 
three groups: “(1) nations of immigrants, in which immigration is 
112  Cohn, 1996.
113  Cohn, 1996.
114  See generally, COLE, 2001.
115  ARENDT, 1998, 123.
116  GOLDBERG, 2011, 362–63.




















































part of the founding national ideal; (2) countries of immigration, 
in which immigration has come to play an important role in social 
and economic development but is not part of the process of nation-
building; (3) latecomers to immigration.”117 The first group consists 
of the United States, Canada, and Australia; the second consists of 
seven countries of Europe; the third consists of Japan and Korea. 
Besides limiting its scope primarily to the countries and settler 
colonies of Europe, the structure of comparison here is troubling 
for at least a few reasons. The first returns us to Legrand’s important 
critique. As even the title betrays, Controlling Immigration has us 
seeing like a state. It narrows our focus to the ordering imperatives 
of the state, such that we risk losing sight of countervailing 
perspectives (namely those of immigrants) as well as counter-
authoritarian concerns (including a respect for the natural capacity 
of human beings to move). 
Second, to group the United States, Canada, and Australia in 
terms of their own founding mythologies is to perpetuate a set 
of grievous fallacies. To identify the United States as “a nation of 
immigrants” is to embrace a deeply ideological construction of the 
national project, one that participates in the myth of American 
exceptionalism while refusing to acknowledge, among other 
things, that the “nation of immigrants” is also a settler nation.118 
Indigenous Americans are not immigrants; many of them refuse 
passports, in defiance of the ongoing crisis of colonialism in which 
we are all implicated.119 In the past decade, scholars of Asian-
American studies in the United States, who have long framed 
their own relation to the United States in terms of national 
recognition and inclusion, have recently begun to explore the 
complicities between Asian immigration and settler colonialism—
indeed, identifying Asian Americans as participants in an ongoing 
settlerism.120 These scholars, engaged in comparative scholarship 
of the relational and minor-translational varieties, have begun to 
raise challenging new questions about immigration and citizenship 
117  HOLLIFIELD, MARTIN, ORRENIUS, 2014.
118  So does it obscure histories of excluding and expelling non-European immigrants—to say 
nothing of the still unresolved legacies of African enslavement.
119  SIMPSON, 2014.
120  FUJIKANE; OKAMURA, 2008; VOLPP, 2015.




















































in the settler colonial context, and they have done so by holding 
themselves accountable to indigenous others. 
Finally, the structure of comparison leaves unexamined certain 
normative assumptions about the contemporary nation-state 
system. For instance, it leaves unexamined the notion that, but for 
some limitation, national sovereignty consists of the right to exclude 
unwelcome foreigners from national territory. But until the turn of 
the twentieth century, European nations imposed few restrictions on 
immigration and generally recognized “the inherent and inalienable 
rights of man to change his home and allegiance.”121 In my own work, 
I have tried to show that, in the United States and other parts of 
the white-settler New World—so-called “nations of immigrants”—
it was the mass migration of Asian laborers that prompted new 
formulations of sovereignty, territorial boundaries, and national 
identity.122 In legal scholarship on immigration, as in public discourse, 
we often take for granted the conceptual and normative priority of 
nation-state borders, as though nations came first, migrants second. 
But as the history of Asian exclusion from the white-settler New 
World demonstrates, new forms of migration continuously give rise 
to new articulations of the nation.123 Likewise, in our present, we 
often take for granted the relative permanence of the international 
system of nation-states, but this is a relatively recent arrangement, 
one that took shape against the backdrop of the European world 
war, the closing of New World frontiers, and intensification of 
decolonization movements in Asia and Africa. If we were to limit 
ourselves to describing “what the law is,” we would acknowledge 
only that states have broad authority to exclude foreigners. But we 
would fail to understand the political and historical contingencies 
that gave rise to our present; we would limit our imagination of 
alternative, more humane futures.
CONCLUSION
At the turn of the twentieth century, white South Africans looked 
























































problem.” Two years after Mississippi introduced a literacy test and 
a poll tax to disenfranchise black voters, the Cape Colony adopted 
similar measures.124 Given that the Mississippi strategy had proven 
so effective, the United States adopted a literacy test to restrict 
undesirable immigration, primarily from Southern and Eastern 
Europe.125 The literacy test for immigration was twice vetoed in the 
United States but quickly adopted in Natal to restrict immigration 
from India.126 With encouragement from the British imperial 
government, the literacy test was adopted in Australia, primarily 
to exclude Chinese immigrants.127 Determined not to repeat the 
mistakes made in the United States—namely of relying on racialized 
castes of “free” or cheap labor—leaders of the new Commonwealth 
were careful to adopt laws that would keep Australia white.128 
Colonialism has always stimulated comparisons. So has resistance 
to colonialism and its racial legacies. Robin D. G. Kelley reminds 
that the sensibility among African American scholars and activists, 
however varied, has always been comparative: defined by a double 
consciousness—what Du Bois described as “this sense of always 
looking at oneself through the eyes of others”—an identification 
with an African past and others of the African diaspora, and a 
solidarity with other racialized minorities in the United States and 
colonized peoples elsewhere.129 The student movements now 
spreading across continents, like the transnational movement taking 
shape under the broad banner of Black Lives Matter, belong to this 
second, decolonizing tradition of comparative thought. In this essay, 
I have tried to advance a vision in which a creative and expansive 
comparative law might play an essential role in decolonizing and 
democratizing legal thought.
124  LAKE, 2005.
125  LAKE, 2005, 218.
126  LAKE, 2005, 219–21.
127  MARKUS, 1979.
128  LAKE, 2005, 213.
129  KELLEY, 1999.
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